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testimony to the resurrection. 
Second, those like Habermas (and like me) who wish to defend a theologically 
traditional interpretation of the resurrection of Jesus find themselves arguing 
these days not only against those who deny that it happened at all but also against 
those who affirm the resurrection of Jesus but claim that it was a spiritual event. 
What was raised was not Jesus' body but rather-they vaguely say-his person, 
soul, or spirit. The only point I wish to make here is that contrary to what he 
says on pp. 26 - 27, Habermas' four core facts do not necessarily point in the 
direction of bodily resurrection. Nor (with the exception of the empty tomb, 
which Habermas recognizes is denied by some reputable scholars) does the larger 
set of twelve accepted facts. The appearances of Jesus after the resurrection-such 
interpreters of the resurrection will say-were spiritual rather than bodily appear-
ances. 
What this implies, I think. is that conservative interpreters of the resurrection 
must argue strongly in favor of both the empty tomb and of the claim that the 
resurrection appearances were bodily appearances. (As Pannenberg notes, this 
requires conjoining the empty tomb tradition with the appearance traditions.) 
Habermas of course recognizes that both must be argued for. I merely point out 
that they do not strictly follow from facts virtually all recognized scholars accept. 
The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, by Jonathan Kvanvig. New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1986. Pp. xvi and 181. 
Reviewed by JOSHUA HOFFMAN, University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
The Possibility of an All-Knowing God is an essay on omniscience and divine 
omniscience, in which the author examines several salient issues relating to these 
concepts. The first such issue pertains to what the author calls the range of 
omniscience. The issue, in other words, is over the answer to the question, what 
must an omniscient being know? In considering this issue, Kvanvig takes up a 
pair of subsidiary ones, each having to do with knowledge of the future. He first 
discusses Geach's thesis that the future is unreal, rejects this thesis, and concludes 
that an omniscient being must know about the future, at least to some extent. 
The second subsidiary issue has to do with knowledge of the future actions of 
free individuals (other than the knower). R. Swinburne has argued that since it 
is impossible for any knower to know such actions, an omniscient being need 
not know them either. K vanvig examines and disputes the two conclusions that 
comprise Swinburne's position: (a) that it's impossible for anyone to know the 
future actions of free individuals; and (b) that an omniscient being need not have 
this sort of knowledge. One might accept (a) and reject (b); in doing so, one 
would be committed to the impossibility of an omniscient being, at least given 
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the existence of other free agents. Swinburne's defense of (a) presupposes that 
human beings are free in a libertarian sense; if they are not, then his defense of 
(a) seems to collapse. Kvanvig disputes (a) on other grounds. One of the key 
assumptions in Kvanvig's reply to (a) is that human beings sometimes foreknow 
the free actions of other human agents. But if human beings really are free in a 
libertarian sense, then there are good reasons to suppose that this assumption is 
false. So I'm not sure that Kvanvig is entitled to this crucial assumption, and 
without it, his reply to (a) is blunted. 
K vanvig defends what he calls the traditional account of omniscience (TAO): 
x is omniscient=df. x knows all true propositions. Swinburne defends a weaker 
concept of being omniscient, not literally being all-knowing, but rather something 
like maximal knowledge. The same issue arises in the case of omnipotence: if 
there is some possible state of affairs which it's impossible for any agent to 
bring about,t hen are we to say that there cannot be an omnipotent agent, or are 
we to say that an omnipotent agent need not be able to do that? In part because 
he accepts (a), Swinburne holds that there are some truths that an omniscient 
being need not know, and he defends this position in part by pointing to what 
he regards to be the analogous case of omnipotence. K vanvig rejects the analogy 
with omnipotence, arguing that just as an omnipotent agent must be able to bring 
about whatever is possible, so too is an omniscient being required to know 
everything true. Kvanvig remarks that "When, in the domain of power, there is 
an apparent limitation on what can be done, it is a limitation regarding the thing 
done ... " (p. 23) I think that Swinburne is right here and Kvanvig wrong. 
There are many cases of possible states of affairs which even a maximally 
powerful being cannot bring about. For example, if Socrates has already walked, 
then no one can bring it about that Socrates walks for the first time, even though 
the latter is a possible state of affairs. Thus, insofar as the analogy with omnipo-
tence is concerned, it supports a "limited" rather than the "traditional" analysis 
of omniscience. Of course, this does not completely settle the matter. 
In chapter 2 of his book, Kvanvig confronts a series of challenges to his 
version of TAO, which says that x is omniscient=df. x justifiably believes a 
proposition p if and only if p is true. Some of these objections consist in denying 
that all knowledge is propositional, for example the argument that de re knowledge 
is not propositional. Another objection to TAO arises from the claim that if de 
se beliefs are propositional, then they give rise to private propositions. This 
claim provides a challenge to TAO by implying that no one can grasp another's 
de se belief. If so, since knowing entails grasping, Kvanvig's TAO entails that 
there is no omniscient being if there are other beings with de se beliefs. K vanvig 
proposes to block this implication by embracing the following quartet of propo-
sitions: (I) there are de se beliefs which are propositional in content; (2) such 
beliefs include individual essences or haecceities; (3) no one else can directly 
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grasp one's haecceity; (4) some one else can indirectly grasp one's haecceity. 
K vanvig accepts the principle that necessarily, if x directly grasps the haecceity 
of (person) y, then x=y. On the other hand, he wants to allow for the possibility 
of God's knowing all true propositions. His solution is (4), which implies that 
God can indirectly grasp the haecceity of another person. 
As I see it, there is a dilemma-like objection to this attempt to solve the privacy 
problem. First, it's far from clear what it is to indirectly grasp a property. 
"Grasping" it in terms of a description won't do, for then one hasn't grasped it 
at all. K vanvig attempts an elucidation of indirectly grasping a property (pp. 
68-70), but I find it of no help. On the other hand, if there is such a thing as 
indirectly grasping a property, then Kvanvig faces a different problem: it's 
difficult to see how if I even indirectly grasp your haecceity, I am not adopting 
a de se belief about you, which is absurd. Hence, for one reason or another, 
Kvanvig's solution of the privacy problem appears to fail. 
In hi s third chapter, K vanvig takes up the thorny issue of the compatibility 
of divine foreknowledge and human freedom (of the libertarian sort), an issue 
much discussed in the recent literature. He is most concerned with incompatibility 
arguments based on the accidental necessity of the past. K vanvig defends com-
patibility by (i) arguing that God's foreknowings are soft, not hard, facts about 
the past; and by (ii) arguing that God's foreknowings are parasitic on certain 
hard facts other than certain of God's particular beliefs. The latter argument is 
intended to satisfy John Fischer's requirement on soft facts while not yielding 
to incompatibilism. God's knowing that g, Kvanvig argues, is parasitic on the 
hard fact, God believes the truth. But surely, God's believing the truth is just 
God's believing p & believing q, etc., for all truths. This conjunctive state of 
God's mind is a soft fact, not a hard one, about the time of the believing. Hence, 
Fischer's requirement is not met. Later, Kvanvig argues that this requirement is 
not justified anyhow, because there are soft facts which don't depend on any 
hard fact (p. 114). His example is the proposition, it was the case yesterday that 
it will rain tomorrow. This is said to be a soft fact about today which rests on 
no hard fact about today. Kvanvig appears to be correct about this example, but 
it also appears that Fischer can formulate his requirement more narrowly, as 
follows: any soft fact about t which is in part a hard fact about t must depend 
on a hard fact about t. Since the soft fact about t, God's knowing at t that Jones 
will do x at t*, is (it seems) in part a hard fact about t, this more narrow 
requirement appears to apply to that soft fact. 
Kvanvig not unjustly thinks that the possibility of foreknowledge of the free 
actions of other persons is in need of elucidation. He attempts to provide this in his 
fourth chapter. There he defends the Molinist account of divine foreknowledge, 
according to which what God knows in order to know what future actions free per-
sons will perform, are "counter-factuals of freedom." K vanvig attempts to defend 
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the coherence of counter-factuals of freedom and to answer the objections of the 
many critics of that notion, but as far as I can tell, he does not succeed. The prob-
lem is that if Jones were in C at t, then in some worlds which are identical up to t, 
he would do one thing freely, and in other such worlds he would do other things 
freely. Doesn't this follow from the assumption that Jones is free in the libertarian 
sense? How then can God know what Jones would do if he were in C, without 
specifying which possible world Jones is in? But how can God specify what world 
Jones is in unless He already knows what Jones will do? 
In a final chapter, Kvanvig discusses the relation between the kind of omni-
science he is defending and the doctrines of divine timelessness and immutability. 
He offers a "limited defense" of the compatibility of these attributes, and argues 
that ifthey were incompatible, then it is omniscience which is more central to our 
understanding of God. 
As I have indicated, I have several serious disagreements with Kvanvig on 
matters of substance. On the other hand, his book has many virtues. It is well-
organized and for the most part clearly written. The author displays a wide-ranging 
knowledge of many difficult issues in metaphysics and epistemology, and offers 
a comprehensive survey of the issues surrounding omniscience. He knows where 
an argument is going and how to try to shore one up. His method is analytic, and 
he frequently resorts to the use of formal definitions (which I consider a virtue). 
Unfortunately, he is not always as careful with these definitions as he should be. 
To take a few examples, his P3 (p. 67) says that if x directly or indirectly grasps y, 
then y is a proposition. This seems incorrect, for people also grasp properties and 
other abstract entities other than propositions. P4 (ibid.) says that if x directly 
grasps proposition y, then y includes x's essence. But surely I can directly grasp 
a purely qualitative proposition such as that some flowers are blue, where that 
proposition does not include my essence. Finally, D2 (p. 122) offers a definition 
of an individual essence whose definiens does not provide a sufficient condition. 
